The 8th Iue Asia Pacific Research Prize Winner:　Lee, Dong Jun

（Summary）

Military tensions in the Korean Peninsula have still persisted, despite the fact that over twenty years have passed since the end of the Cold War. Why is it impossible for the Korean Peninsula to move out of the current situations of ‘an isolated island of the Cold War’? This thesis attempts to search for a clue to answer this question. Its focus is on Sino-American rapprochement and the transformation of the Korean divided system in the first half decade of the 1970s, a period known as the détente era.

Sino-American rapprochement has been explained so far in the context of the Taiwan issue, or in connection with the power structure of major countries. Its relevance to the ‘Korean Question’, in contrast, has failed to attract much attention. The main argument in this thesis, however, is that the structure of confrontation in the Korean Question during and after the Korean War transformed as a result of interactions between Sino-American rapprochement and the North-South Korea dialogues in the détente era. The thesis also contends that the strategic reconciliation between Washington and Beijing constituted a kind of ‘intermediate settlement’ of the Korean War. This settlement ultimately triggered the transformation of the Korean divided system, the basic characteristics of which have still remained in place.

This thesis focuses on two primary factors embedded in the Korean divided system, which confronted both Washington and Beijing during their secret talks for rapprochement. The first element is the problem of legitimacy, that is, the question of “the only legitimate government’ in the Korean Peninsula. The United States and the United Nations designated China and North Korea as ‘belligerent parties’ in the Korean War, but Sino-American rapprochement and China’s seating in the U.N. (China-U.N. rapprochement) fundamentally changed this structure of confrontation. In particular, China demanded the dissolution of the so-called ‘UN cap’, i.e., the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) and the UN Command (UNC). Having been founded during the Korean War, these institutions symbolized a claim that South Korea was the only legitimate government in the Peninsula.

The other factor is a security issue, which evolved around the U.S. armed forces in Korea (USFK). Mutual understanding of the role of the USFK was a precondition for U.S.-China reconciliation. It was because the USFK acted as a ‘deterrent’ against an attack from Chinese/North Korean armed forces during and after the Korean War whereas China regarded the U.S. military presence as a ‘threat’ to her own security. Consequently, it was necessary for the United States to convince China that the USFK did not aim against China. But any change of the USFK posed a serious problem for two Koreas as it would directly affect their own national security.

Disputes among countries concerned over the above two factors determined the course of détente with regards to the Korean Peninsula. Chapter 1 provides a preliminary discussion, explaining relations between the above issues as well as the Korean divided system. The system can be best characterized as the ‘nest-of-boxes’ structure of confrontation, with Sino-American confrontation buttressing the conflict between North and South Korea.

Chapter 2 explores correlations between the change of Sino-American relation and the Korean security situation from 1969 to 1970. This period can be said as the ‘time of the initial approach” between Washington and Beijing. Here a close focus is placed on the Nixon Administration's policy of withdrawing U.S. ground forces from South Korea. This policy was discussed alongside with the reviewing of the conventional containment policy vis-à-vis China. The Nixon Administration considered that the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces would not only lead to the reduction of its burdensome military commitment to South Korea, but also pave the way to the normalization talks with China. As a result, the 7th Division of the USFK was pulled out, and the Korean forces took over the 2nd Division's field of operations. This had an effect of localizing the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) in the Korean Peninsula, reducing it to the simple confrontment line between two Koreas for the first time after the Korean War. This served as a physical foundation to facilitate the change of the Korean divided system.

While Sino-American reconciliation talks unfolded after Kissinger's secret visit to China in 1971, two Koreas began to communicate with one another for the first time after the Korean War. Both sides shared the common interest in hedging a crisis in which the two superpower allies might abandon them. On the other hand, two Koreas consolidated an authoritarian system to protect their own internal system. In Chapters 3 and 4, it is shown that relations between North and South Korea underwent transformation from the previous mode of ‘confrontation without talks’ to that of ‘confrontation with talks.’ This adjustment took place as a response to the shock of Sino-American reconciliation talks. Chapter 5 details the development of mutual understanding on the vital issue of Korea as the United States and China forged strategic relations in particular to counter the Soviet Union. First of all, Washington and Beijing agreed on the role of the USFK and its gradual withdrawal. In the newly redefined role the USFK would act as a ‘stabilizer’ in Northeastern Asia including the Korean Peninsula. It was expected to maintain the balance of power, especially as a check against the potential expansionism of the Soviet Union and Japan. With China’s understanding of the USFK’s role and its continued deployment, the Nixon administration abandoned the plan of extending Nixon Doctrine to South Korea.

Secondly, the United States and China cooperated in settling the legitimacy issue related to the United Nations. Accordingly, the UNCURK was dissolved without fanfare at the 28th UN General Assembly. In brief, the course of the Korean Question, set jointly by the two powers in rapprochement, did not move toward dismantling the Korean divided system in favor of unification. Instead, it aimed at no other than the stabilization of the ‘two legitimate government’ based on the premise of Sino-American engagement in the Korean Question.

These arrangements made during Sino-American secret talks, however, gave rise to differences in the concepts of détente and security between a pair of allies in each camp as well as between two Koreas. As described in Chapter 6, North Korea in particular opposed the continued deployment of the USFK and demanded the conclusion of a peace treaty with the United States in 1974 as a move to undermine South Korea's legitimacy. And worse yet, Washington and Beijing gave priority to maintaining alliance rather than collectively exerting influence over Korean problems. After all, both of them confronted one another at the UN General Assembly of 1974 and 1975, which led to the simultaneous adoption of two contradictory resolutions.

But the character of the confrontation structure by then had fundamentally changed from that before Sino-American rapprochement. While the United States and China stood on the opposite side over the Korean problems, both still forged the common understanding of the USFK’ role as a stabilizer. Besides, they sought to share the strategic interest of maintaining the present cease-fire system in the Korean Peninsula. It can be said that the approval of two contradictory resolutions at the UN General Assembly in 1975 represented a kind of compromise between the United States and China. The logical result was the recognition of ‘two antagonistic legal governments’ in the Korean Peninsula and the eternal freeze of USFK and UNC issues.

This outcome points to the formation of a new risk management system. We might be able to call this system Sino-American Concert of the Korean Peninsula, evolving around a peculiar dynamism of ‘adequate cooperation and check’ between the United States and China. This suggests that the Korean Question would be continuously contained within the frame of the strategic interest of Washington and Beijing. Two Koreas, which had been devoting themselves to an antagonistic confrontation to deny even the existence of the opponent, accepted the coexistence of both sides in response to the structural changes and developed a competitive relationship as a realistic strategy. The Korean divided system, which was restructured through the ‘three storylines’—détente between Washington and Beijing and between Seoul and Pyongyang as well as ‘behind-the-scenes’ Sino-American negotiations regarding the Korean Question—has been maintaining its basic frame while containing new unstable factors after the end of the Cold War.